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THE INCREMENTAL TRAIL IN DEVELOPING FALSE DOCTRINE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
IN THE AMERICAN DRUG SCENE
Avron Heiligman, Assistant Professor
The George Warren Brown School of Social Work
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
ABSTRACT
The trail of what has turned out to be the criminalization of drug taking
behavior illustrates a major criticism of incrementalism in developing policy--
the acceptance and maintenance of specific values and attitudes. The effects of
false doctrine accepted more than fifty years ago are with us today and will
continue in their effect umtil a radical change is seen in our society. The
purpose of this paper is to map the old trail, identify those times where false
doctrine was accepted, and to present a radical alternative for the future.
The non-medical use of drugs has attracted attention from many disciplines
during the last few years. Many descriptions of the drug user have been presented
along with large numbers of reasons explaining the motivations for drug taking
behavior. The thrust of what can be termed a social movement is credited to two
former psychologists at Harvard, Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert. Their
directive of 'Tune-In, Turn-On and Drop-Out" was the catalyst to a ground-swell of
drug experimentation on the part of young people that stimulated panic, thought
and writing about using drugs.
For a student in Social Policy, the history of drug legislation in the
United States illustrates a prime example of incrementalism. The trail of what
has turned out to be the criminalization of drug taking behavior illustrates a
major criticism of incrementalism in developing policy--the acceptance and
maintenance of specific values and attitudes. The effects of false doctrine
accepted more than fifty years ago are with us today and will continue in their
effect until a radical change is seen in our society. The purpose of this paper
is to map the old trail, a radical alternative for the future.
Beginnings:
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 is a significant milestone. Before this
time morphine could be purchased as easily as cigarettes or flour. Many medicines
incorporated it in their "healing" formulae. When the public began to understand
the effects of these patented medicines, addiction was thought of as nothing more
than a non-desirable behavior--like having bad breath in today's world. Many
members of the middle class and pillars of the community were addicts. This
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included many former soldiers of the Civil War who yere given morphine for pain
and developed what was called "the soldier's disease".
During the period of 1875 until 1900, a number of states enacted laws
against smoking opium. No thought was given to any law pertaining to drinking
medicine with morphine or injecting morphine. (Pharmacologically, morphine is a
derivative of opium, and hence, the effects on a human body are the same). This
contradiction of behavior related to a value and moral problem in the society that
had as its foundation a prejudicial feeling against the Chinese.
Many Chinese had been brought to this country to help build the railroads.
Being that they were involved in a very difficult labor and working conditions,
they required an acceptable release and relaxation method for themselves. They
adopted their mother country's vehicle of smoking opium for relaxation. The
prejudice against the Chinese was translated into an anti-opium smoking obsession
which then initiatld the "aggressive, debauched, and sexually aggressive image of
the opium smoker."
Two patterns of opium use developed during this time. There were the
smokers--Chinese, and the drinkers or injectors--the rest of the users. This
latter group was made up of mostly upper and middle-class, white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants who were generally female. The latter pattern was viewed as
acceptable because "good people did it. The other pattern was viewed as a growing
menace".
The Pure Food and Drug Act did not do much to decrease the supply for the
drinkers and injectors, it merely brought the supply under closer control and
centralized the purchasing in pharmacies instead of an open wagon or grocery
store. What it did do, however, by implication, was to legitimize one type of use
and sanction an attitude about the other type. Thus began the"dope fiend" myth in
the United States.
The second milestone in our trail is the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.
Although there are some international foreign policy issues that enter the trail
at this point, it is suffice to say that for the purposes of this paper, the
Harrison Act came around at a convenient time to provide a national regulatory
mechanism. In brief, the act was not meant to be a prohibitionary statute in any
way, rather "a mild regulatory measure consisting of registration and
record-keeping requirements to which a moderate federal tax was added in 1919.
Its avowel purpose was to bring the domestic drug traffic into observable
channels ."
The Harrison Act did not impose any restrictions on who might register and
deal with narcotic drugs so long as the records were kept and taxes paid. The
issue of addiction was never mentioned in any wording of the Act. Physicians were
allowed to dispense narcotics in the course of their treatment for patients. What
about drug-addicted patients? That is another story.
Dr. Robert Felix believes that the moralists won out in any struggle in
relation to the drug addicted since they believed it wrong to take drugs in order
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to feel good. They did not consider any disease elements in this 5need, nor for
that matter, the need to have an opiate drug merely to feel normal. So when the
possession of smuggled drugs became illegal, the addict was forced to go to a
physician as the only remaining source for legal drugs. This did not make a good
illicit market in drugs as the police and pushers "foumd themselves identically
interested in squeezing the addict and cutting him off from pgssible help as a
patient and have maintained a defacto partnership ever since."
It must be remembered that the Harrison Act did not disallow physicians
from treating patients who needed opiates. There were pressure groups in the
country that did not approve of this apparent loophole in the Harrison Act. The
squeeze play became finalized in a nuber of Supreme Court decisions surrounding
the activities of physicians. The physicians chosen were involved in questionable
activity with respect to their procedure in handing out opiate prescriptions. The
most significant decision, United States vs. Behruan, 1922, " .... launched a reign
of terror threatening any doctors who had anything further to do with drug
addicts, 9 d sending a goodly number of recalcitrant practitioners off to
prison...." This activity saw the end of the addict-patient and the birth of the
addict-criminal. The only remaining source for the needed opiate drug was the
underworld. The American Medical Association 1 upported this with attacks on drug
addicts as "malefactors rather than patients."
Three years later in Linder vs. United States, the Court dismissed the
Behrman decision and allowed the physicians once again to treat addicts. But the
medical profession had dissassociated itself from the problem generally and
physicians 9 specifically withdrew their activities in helping the addicted
individual. Even in the 1960's, four decades after Linder, narcotics bureau
regulations advising doctors and pharmacists of their rights in defling with
addicts, continued to ignore what the Supreme Court had so plainly said.
The Middle:
In 1930, Henry J. Anslinger became the first Commissioner of Narcotics. He
He had little background in narcotics during the ten years of government
experience, including diplomatic assignments, although he did show himself to be a
capable assistant commissioner of prohibition and learned a great deal of what not
to do in this capacity. While with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from
1930-1962, Anslingef 2 met with almost no counter force to his attitudes, ideas and
policy formulation. His position on narcotics became the official United States
position, and I played a major role in influencing narcotic control on the world
front as well. While World War II was raging, the level of addiction declined
significantly, however, by 1948 Anslinger said that addicts number 1 in 3,000
population. Other observers said that there were no striking post-war increases
in addiction and14suggested that drug addiction might not be so great a national
hazard after all.
It did not take long for the Narcotics Bureau to get into action.
Anslinger and others began to publicize the "alarming upswing of addiction and
they focused on young people, who, it was said, were the target of the criminal
drug addict, pusher types, who derived real pleasure from inducing others to
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follow the same vices."'
5
The United States Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime
in Inter-State Comerce, commonly called the Kefauver Committee brings the
historical perspective of our trail in false doctrine to a significant milestone:
The Boggs Bill was enacted in 1951. Anslinger was one of the first witnesses to
Kefauver's Connittee and he emphasized his Bureau's contribution to the reduction
of addiction. He testified that his Bureau's enforcemiet of the narcotics law for
the past generation had reduced the problem by half. In the conclusion to his
testimony, Anslinger urged more severe sentences for all drug offenders. There
was no mention of any medical or health issues involved, rather, there was a
reinforcement of the idea that drug use was a criminal activity. As a result of
this testimony and the continued propaganda on the same criminal theme, the
Kefauver Committee adopted the Boggs Bill as one of the recommendations in 1951
and the Bill was enacted by the 82nd Congress. Anslinger's request was honored.
Passage of the Act required the signature of President Harry Truman. It is
curious to note a contradiction in Truman's behavior with respect to the continued
criminalization of drug taking and his concern about a national health program.
In his Memoirs, Truman states, "I believe that the United States should be the
healthiest country in the world and j1ad in finding and developing new ways to
improve the health of every citizen." In his first comprehensive statement on
national health delivered on November 18, 1945, Truman ctiled for "health security
for all, regardless of residence, station or race." He went on to call for
research on mental diseases and abnormalities.
In 1946 the National Institute of Mental Health was established. According
to its first director, Dr. Robert .Felix, the Institute came about because of an
early thrust in narcotic addiction. This seems to imply that Truman was not
unaware of the association between drug addiction and mental health. At about the
same time in 1946, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) was organized
out of the annual meeting of American Psychiatric Association. The GAP had as its
working objective, a commitment to pay more Med to the relation between
psychiatric problems and the social environment. If what we mean by social
environment includes legislative behavior, then drug taking behavior and the
criminalization process that accompanies this behavior enters the picture in a
significant way. The GAP and a small number of other professionals saw addiction
as a public health problem, but the overpowering force of Anslinger and his
propaganda became the mode of thought and action with respect to the drug addict.
Since most physicians already had preconceived ideas about accepting addicts as
patients due to the Behrman decision, there was little help from their quarter,
irrespective of the fact that the American Medical Association became involved in
a bitter fight over Truman's proposal for national health insurance.
When Truman spoke out about the nation's health, his comments reflected
concern that could easily and acceptably be identified by the general public, and
it would have been inconceivable to have mentioned drug addiction when talking
about health. That issue had already been imprinted in the public mind as a
criminal activity disassociated with any concern about health. The value and
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attitudes of the American public seemed to be a static form. This phenomenon
continued even with the opposition of Dr. Robert Felix who led a group that
believed....
there were people who functioned better if they were taking some kinds of
drugs; but this went contrary to the moralistic approach that was typified
by the Bureau of Narcotics--Harry Anslinger. Anslinger felt that tjre
was only one way to treat addiction--throw all of the addicts in jail.
There can be little question that Anslinger put his message across not
only to the American public, but to President Truman himself who sent a letter to
Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. In it we read the
Boggs Bill, HR-3498, passed the House of Representatives. The President urged
its passage through this committee and the Senate in order to make it law.
Although the letter is signed by H.S.T., the language is familiarily H.J.A. and
the Bureau of Narcotics. Conspjiously absent from the letter is any reference
to addiction as a health concern.
The Chairman of the Criminal Section of the American Bar Association sent
Truman a telegram on October 24, 1951. In this letter Arthur J. Freund, the
chairman, clearly states and strongly words an objection to the Boggs Bill. We
read in this telegram that "the legislation was approved without a hearing and
without an opportunity to present amendments which would lke it applicable only
to peddlers and those who profit from the narcotic trade" Irrespective of the
pressures, the Bill was signed. In a statement to the press about the Bill,
Trunan also announced the creation of the Inter-Departmental Committee on
Narcotics made up from representatives from Treasury, State, Defense, Justice,
Agriculture and the Federal Security Agency. On November 29, 1951, Under
Secretary Foley of the Treasury Department sent a letter to Mr. Truman
designating the Comaissioner of Narcotics, Harry J. Anslinger, as representative
for the Treasury Department. Harry J. Anslinger and his empire was being
reinforced through the creation of this Inter-Departmental CommittHe on
Narcotics. President Truman appointed him chairman in an executive order.
There was no input from the medical profession or other health related
professions of this committee. This author can only assume that Mr. Truman
:accepted the Anslinger line and further enhanced the Anslinger image which
ireinforced the concept of drug taking behavior as a criminal activity. Public
-attention had been directed at a powerful figure, Anslinger, along with an
enotionally laden idea, drug addiction as criminal behavior which proved to be an
extension of the early values and attitudes created in our society about drug
use .... Another example of the old dictating the new.
Endings:
The final enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 was the signing ceremony at the headquarters of the Bureau of; arcotics and Dangerous Drugs on October 27, 1970. "Everything about this new
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measure focused on repression". 2 6 This was another piece of incrementalism that
can only be understood in light of some of the activities that were carried on
during the 1960's. It is difficult to rank significant issues and events arising
from those issues in the 1960's as they relate to the United States. Such a
discussion must include the Vietnam War, racism, assassination, and the drug
culture. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to show relationships
between the drug-counter-culture and the other events. It is important, however,
to suggest that drug-taking behavior increased dramatically in all populations and
policy makers were faced with a force that was producing some disequilibrium. It
was not important to the policy makers that individuals were turning to drugs in
order to find "peace and tranquility." It did not occur to the policy makers that
for a large segment of the population, equilibrium did not exist and the response
to this equilibrium was in the direction of drug use. It did not occur to the
policy makers that drug-taking behavior allowed an individual to become passive
and uncaring about his environment. The policy maker ignored the fact that
alcohol was the most used and abused drug in the United States, was the force
behind most traffic fatalities, caused losses in the billions of dollars in
American business and industry, but was accepted because of its legality. In
contrast to this, policy makers turned their attention to existing laws that said
particular kinds of drugs and their use was illegal and, therefore, attention was
gained for a law-and-order posture. The result of this attention was the
aforementioned Comprehension Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. It
"pulled together elgrything congress had done in the field since the opium smoking
curbs of 1887 .... "
So far as we know, it is only the intellectually elite that was heard when
questions were raised about the existing policies. In their book, The Road to H,
the authors make the following statement:
The gravity of the problem, drug addiction, has to our minds been grossly
misassessed, not so much in terms of the investment in it as in terms of
the gains which the investment is calculated to achieve. Judging from the
development of efforts, from policies adopted, from the emphasis and
conclusions of legislative commissions of inquiry, from statements made by
responsible individuals in testimony before such commissions of inquiry and
in the public media of information, the "jor goal is to suppress the
problem, rather than to deal with its causes. The basis for sanctions (of
drugs) is predominently attitudinal-moral; culture and custom support the
use of a substance, considerations of this substance's harmfulness are
remarkably ineffective. When culture and custom prescribe the use of a
substance, 9 arrangements based on scientific arguments are far from
effective. 
2
Robert DuPont, director of the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse
Prevention, has recently made a statement calling for the decriminalization of
marijuana use. The American Bar Association has made a similar statement and has
done so over two year ago. Are these helpful? Are they meaningful? Are these
statements anything more than incrementalism? The answer to the first two
questions is maybe; the answer to the last question is an unequivocal--No. What
these statements prove is that "current policy is largely the result of reactions
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of the moment to the present political pulse of the country."
3 0
What is required is not that we maintain our sacred cow values and
attitudes. Rather, we should question these values and attitudes in ways that
direct us to adopt those that are entirely in opposition. Thomas S. Szasz offers a
direction that my be just that. He does so by illustrating the absurd and
oftentimes contradictory values under which we now lead our lives. In an essay
entitled, "The Ethics of Addiction", he writes:
I believe that just as we regard freedom of speech and religion as
fundamental rights, so should we also regard freedom of self-medication as a
fundamental right, and instead of mendaciously opposing or mindlessly
opposing illicit drugs, you should paraphrase Voltaire and adopt as our
position, "I disapprov~lof what you take, but I will defend to the death
your right to take it".
Szasz' prescription would certainly require us to confront our value
systems. What he is calling for sounds like a precondition to change our paradigm
of life style. This would not be unlike what Thomas Kuhn suggests occurs in the
scientific world when new discoveries force scientists to change their theoretical
paradigm. Perhaps we have done this already. Historians will look to the 1960's
as an era of revolutionary behavior. Perhaps we have already changed our paradigm
in life styles so that we are in the process of reaching that goal to which Szasz
ascribes.
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